Cooperative assignment games with the inverse Monge property

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Title:	Cooperative assignment games with the inverse Monge property
Author:	Martínez de Albéniz, F. Javier; Rafels, Carles
Other authors:	Universitat de Barcelona
Abstract:	We study inverse-Monge assignment games, namely cooperative assignment games in which the assignment matrix satisfies the inverse-Monge property. For square inverse-Monge assignment games, we describe their cores and we obtain a closed formula for the buyers-optimal and the sellers-optimal core allocations. We also apply the above results to solve the non-square case.
Subject(s):	-Funcions de variables reals -Assignació de recursos -Matemàtica financera -Teoria de jocs -Functions of real variables -Resource allocation -Business mathematics -Game theory
Rights:	(c) Elsevier B.V., 2014
Document type:	Article Article - Accepted version
Published by:	Elsevier B.V.
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