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The number of parties and decision making in legislatures
Bannikova, Marina; Jelnov, Artyom
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which have to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist who is interested in a certain outcome of the vote. We show that the ease of manipulating a legislature decision by the lobbyist is increasing with the number of parties. A high threshold leads to fewer parties represented, and consequently, decreases the ease of changing a legislature decision by the lobbyist. On the other hand, a high threshold may cause a misrepresentation of voters. We show that if the threshold is higher that 6%, the impact of the misrepresentation effect becomes significant.
32 - Política
Ciències polítiques -- Presa de decisions
Partits polítics
Grups de pressió
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8 p.
Working Paper
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2016-13

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