Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/260962

Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games
Osório, António (António Miguel)
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
This paper examines different Brownian information structures for varying time intervals. We focus on the non-limit case and on the trade-offs between information quantity and quality to efficiently establish incentives. These two dimensions of information tend to complement each other when signals quality is sufficiently high. Otherwise, information quantity tends to replace information quality. Any conclusion depends crucially on the rate at which information quality improves or decays with respect to the discounting incentives. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Information Quantity, Information Quality.
2015
33 - Economia
Jocs, Teoria de
Teoria de la informació (Economia)
Contractes -- Aspectes econòmics
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
12 p.
Working Paper
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-32
         

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