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Gathering support from rivals: the two agent case with random order
Bannikova, Marina; Giménez Gómez, José M. (José Manuel)
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
Which alternative is selected when voters are called to participate in a sequential voting? Does the ordering matter? The current approach is the first attempt to analyze these questions. Specifically, we propose a two- alternative sequential voting procedure in which two voters are randomly ordered. Each voter has complete information about the preference of both of them. The alternative is implemented if there is unanimity. We obtain that the most patient individual has some advantage in the election, but it is not enough to guarantee that his most-preferred alternative will be selected. The probability to vote first also plays a central role, since the election also depends on the voting order. Keywords: Sequential Voting; Random order; Sub-game perfect equilibrium
32 - Política
Elecció (Psicologia)
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13 p.
Working Paper
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-27

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