| dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
| dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
| dc.contributor.author |
Garcia Fortuny, Judit |
| dc.date.accessioned |
2015-09-16T17:04:16Z |
| dc.date.available |
2015-09-16T17:04:16Z |
| dc.date.created |
2015 |
| dc.date.issued |
2015 |
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/254374 |
| dc.format.extent |
25 p. |
| dc.language.iso |
eng |
| dc.publisher |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-25 |
| dc.rights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.rights |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
| dc.source |
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) |
| dc.subject.other |
Corrupció |
| dc.subject.other |
Unions monetàries |
| dc.subject.other |
Política fiscal |
| dc.subject.other |
Política monetària |
| dc.title |
The Effects of Corruption in a Monetary Union |
| dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
| dc.subject.udc |
33 - Economia |
| dc.embargo.terms |
cap |
| dc.description.abstract |
Many countries around the world suffer from corruption. In a monetary union, corruption varies from one country to another. It is possible corruption in one country may
affect another country in a monetary union. We demonstrate that this feature has important implications in a monetary union with two asymmetric countries. Country 1 has
a corrupted government while country 2 does not. Within this framework, we determine
under which conditions corruption damages or benefits both countries. We find that corruption in country 1 may have a positive or negative effect on country 2. In particular,
when the government of country 1 is much more concerned about public spending than
output, corruption damages both countries. In addition, we investigate how country 1
could compensate country 2 for the negative externality.
JEL classification: D60, D73, E52, E58, E62.
Keywords: Corruption; Fiscal Policy; Monetary Policy; Monetary Union. |
