Para acceder a los documentos con el texto completo, por favor, siga el siguiente enlace: http://hdl.handle.net/2117/76532

On the stability of generalized second price auctions with budgets
Díaz Cort, Josep; Giotis, Ioannis; Kirousis, Lefteris; Markakis, Evangelos; Serna Iglesias, María José
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Ciències de la Computació; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. ALBCOM - Algorismia, Bioinformàtica, Complexitat i Mètodes Formals
The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used typically to model sponsored search auctions does not include the notion of budget constraints, which is present in practice. Motivated by this, we introduce the different variants of GSP auctions that take budgets into account in natural ways. We examine their stability by focusing on the existence of Nash equilibria and envy-free assignments. We highlight the differences between these mechanisms and find that only some of them exhibit both notions of stability. This shows the importance of carefully picking the right mechanism to ensure stable outcomes in the presence of budgets.
Peer Reviewed
Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Informàtica
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
Springer
         

Mostrar el registro completo del ítem

Documentos relacionados

Otros documentos del mismo autor/a

Díaz Cort, Josep; Giotis, Ioannis; Kirousis, Lefteris; Markakis, Evangelos; Serna Iglesias, María José
Álvarez Faura, M. del Carme; Díaz Cort, Josep; Petit Silvestre, Jordi; Rolim, José; Serna Iglesias, María José
Díaz Cort, Josep; Serna Iglesias, María José; Spirakis, Paul George
Álvarez Faura, M. del Carme; Blesa Aguilera, Maria Josep; Díaz Cort, Josep; Fernández Anta, Antonio; Serna Iglesias, María José
Álvarez Faura, M. del Carme; Díaz Cort, Josep; Blesa Aguilera, Maria Josep; Fernández Anta, Antonio; Serna Iglesias, María José