Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/253858

Legitimacy, communication and leadership in the Turnaround game
Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J.; Weber, Roberto
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study the effectiveness of leaders for inducing coordinated organizational change to a more efficient equilibrium, i.e., a turnaround. We compare communication from leaders to incentive increases and also compare the effectiveness of randomly selected and elected leaders. While all interventions yield shifts to more efficient equilibria, communication from leaders has a greater effect than incentives. Moreover, leaders who are elected by followers are significantly better at improving their group's outcome than randomly selected ones. The improved effectiveness of elected leaders results from sending more performance-relevant messages. Our results are evidence that the way in which leaders are selected affects their legitimacy and the degree to which they influence followers. Finally, we observed that a combination of factors- incentive increases and elected leaders-yield near universal turnarounds to full efficiency.
2014-03-08
Experiments
Leadership
Communication
Coordination Failure
Job Selection
33 - Economia
Lideratge
Selecció de personal
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62 p.
Working Paper
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
Working papers;947.14
         

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