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Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Massó, Jordi
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three nec- essary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilat- erally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. We perform a specific analysis of all median voter schemes, the anonymous subfamily of generalized median voter schemes.
2014-02
Generalized Median Voting Schemes
Strategy-proofness
Anonymity
Vot -- Models matemàtics
33 - Economia
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44 p.
Working Paper
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
Working papers;946.14
         

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