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Success and decisiveness on proper symmetric games
Freixas Bosch, Josep; Pons Vallès, Montserrat
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada III; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
This paper provides a complete study for the possible rankings of success and decisiveness for individuals in symmetric voting systems, assuming anonymous and independent probability distributions. It is proved that for any pair of symmetric voting systems it is always possible to rank success and decisiveness in opposite order whenever the common probability of voting for “acceptance” is big enough. On the contrary, for probability values lower than one–half it is not possible to reverse the ranking of these two measures.
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Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística
Game theory
Decision making--Mathematical models
Voting--Mathematical models
Success
Decisiveness
Symmetric simple voting games
Rankings
Jocs, Teoria de
Decisió, Presa de -- Models matemàtics
Vot -- Models matemàtics
Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion
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