Título:
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Success and decisiveness on proper symmetric games
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Autor/a:
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Freixas Bosch, Josep; Pons Vallès, Montserrat
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Otros autores:
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Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada III; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs |
Abstract:
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The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10100-013-0332-5 |
Abstract:
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This paper provides a complete study for the possible rankings of success and decisiveness
for individuals in symmetric voting systems, assuming anonymous and independent
probability distributions. It is proved that for any pair of symmetric voting
systems it is always possible to rank success and decisiveness in opposite order whenever
the common probability of voting for “acceptance” is big enough. On the contrary, for
probability values lower than one–half it is not possible to reverse the ranking of these
two measures. |
Abstract:
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Award-winning |
Materia(s):
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-Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs -Game theory -Decision making -- Mathematical models -Voting -- Mathematical models -Success -Decisiveness -Symmetric simple voting games -Rankings -Jocs, Teoria de -Decisió, Presa de -- Models matemàtics -Vot -- Models matemàtics -Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory |
Derechos:
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Tipo de documento:
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Artículo - Versión presentada Artículo |
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