Utilizad este identificador para citar o enlazar este documento: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/247807

On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games
Calleja, Pere; Llerena Garrés, Francesc
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
On the domain of cooperative transferable utility games, we investigate if there are single valued solutions that reconcile rationality, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition) properties. This paper collects some impossibility results on the combination of core selection with either complement or projected consistency, and core selection, max consistency and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results show up when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.
2015
33 - Economia
Jocs cooperatius
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24 p.
Documento de trabajo
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-12
         

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