dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
dc.contributor.author |
Cano Berlanga, Sebastian |
dc.contributor.author |
Giménez Gómez, José M. (José Manuel) |
dc.contributor.author |
Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia |
dc.date.accessioned |
2015-03-11T14:46:06Z |
dc.date.available |
2015-03-11T14:46:06Z |
dc.date.created |
2015 |
dc.date.issued |
2015 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/247653 |
dc.format.extent |
20 p. |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.publisher |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2015-06 |
dc.rights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.source |
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) |
dc.subject.other |
Jocs cooperatius |
dc.title |
Enjoying cooperative games: The R package GameTheory |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
33 - Economia |
dc.embargo.terms |
cap |
dc.description.abstract |
This paper focuses on cooperative games with transferable utility. We propose the
computation of two solutions, the Shapley value for n agents and the nucleolus with a
maximum of four agents. The current approach is also focused on conflicting claims
problems, a particular case of coalitional games. We provide the computation of the most
well-known and used claims solutions: the proportional, the constrained equal awards, the
constrained equal losses, the Talmud and the random arrival rules.
Keywords: Cooperative game, Shapley value, nucleolus, claims problem, claims rule, bankruptcy. |