Enumeration of weighted games with minimum and an analysis of voting power for bipartite complete games with minimum

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dc.contributor	Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada III
dc.contributor	Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs
dc.contributor.author	Freixas Bosch, Josep
dc.contributor.author	Kurz, Sascha
dc.date	2014-11
dc.identifier.citation	Freixas, J.; Kurz, S. Enumeration of weighted games with minimum and an analysis of voting power for bipartite complete games with minimum. "Annals of operations research", Novembre 2014, vol. 222, núm. 1, p. 317-339.
dc.identifier.citation	0254-5330
dc.identifier.citation	10.1007/s10479-013-1348-x
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2117/25089
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation	https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10479-013-1348-x
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject	Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
dc.subject	Voting--Mathematical models
dc.subject	Game theory
dc.subject	Simple game
dc.subject	Weighted and complete games
dc.subject	Enumerations
dc.subject	Shapley-Shubik power index
dc.subject	Banzhaf power indices
dc.subject	Ordinal equivalence
dc.subject	Europena Union
dc.subject	Dimension
dc.subject	Semivalues
dc.subject	Council
dc.subject	Indexes
dc.subject	System
dc.subject	Vot -- Models matemàtics
dc.subject	Jocs, Teoria de
dc.subject	Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91A Game theory
dc.subject	Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences::91B Mathematical economics
dc.title	Enumeration of weighted games with minimum and an analysis of voting power for bipartite complete games with minimum
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersion
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.description.abstract	This paper is a twofold contribution. First, it contributes to the problem of enumerating some classes of simple games and in particular provides the number of weighted games with minimum and the number of weighted games for the dual class as well. Second, we focus on the special case of bipartite complete games with minimum, and we compare and rank these games according to the behavior of some efficient power indices of players of type 1 (or of type 2). The main result of this second part establishes all allowable rankings of these games when the Shapley-Shubik power index is used on players of type 1.
dc.description.abstract	Peer Reviewed

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