dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
dc.contributor.author |
Llerena Garrés, Francesc |
dc.contributor.author |
Mauri Masdeu, Llúcia |
dc.date.accessioned |
2014-05-05T16:12:05Z |
dc.date.available |
2014-05-05T16:12:05Z |
dc.date.created |
2014 |
dc.date.issued |
2014 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/228404 |
dc.format.extent |
11 p. |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.publisher |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2014-07 |
dc.rights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.source |
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) |
dc.subject.other |
Jocs cooperatius |
dc.title |
A note on the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the imputation set |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
33 - Economia |
dc.embargo.terms |
cap |
dc.description.abstract |
In this note we introduce the Lorenz stable set and provide an axiomatic
characterization in terms of constrained egalitarianism and projection consistency. On the domain of all coalitional games, we find that this solution
connects the weak constrained egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray, 1989)
with their strong counterpart (Dutta and Ray, 1991) |