Utilizad este identificador para citar o enlazar este documento: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/227177

Cooperative games with size-truncated information
Martínez de Albéniz, F. Javier
[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.
25-03-2014
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Anàlisi cost-benefici
Anàlisi vectorial
Càlcul de variacions
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Cost effectiveness
Vector analysis
Calculus of variations
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Martínez de Albéniz, 2013
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
Documento de trabajo
Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
         

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