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Título:
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The minimum sum representation as an index of voting power
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Autor/a:
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Freixas Bosch, Josep; Kaniovski, Serguei
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Otros autores:
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Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtica Aplicada III; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs |
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Abstract:
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We propose a new power index based on the minimum sum representation (MSR) of a
weighted voting game. The MSR o ers a redesign of a voting game, such that voting power
as measured by the MSR index becomes proportional to voting weight. The MSR index is a
coherent measure of power that is ordinally equivalent to the Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik and
Johnston indices. We provide a characterization for a bicameral meet as a weighted game or
a complete game, and show that the MSR index is immune to the bicameral meet paradox.
We discuss the computation of the MSR index using a linear integer program and the inverse MSR problem of designing a weighted voting game with a given distribution of power. |
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Abstract:
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Peer Reviewed |
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Materia(s):
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-Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística
-Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Teoria de jocs
-Voting--Mathematical models
-Bicameral meet
-Minimum integer sum representation
-Power indices
-Proportional design between shares and power
-Rankings
-Vot -- Models matemàtics
-Classificació AMS::91 Game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences |
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Derechos:
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Tipo de documento:
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Artículo - Versión presentada
Artículo |
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Editor:
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Elsevier
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Compartir:
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