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Some game-theoretic grounds for meeting people half-way
Gadea-Blanco, Pedro; Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel; Marco-Gil, María del Carmen
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública
It is well known that, in distributions problems, fairness rarely leads to a single viewpoint (see, for instance, Young (1994)). In this context, this paper provides interesting bases that support the simple and commonly observed behavior of reaching intermediate agreements when two prominent distribution proposals highlight a discrepancy in sharing resources. Specifi cally, we formalize such a conflicting situation by associating it with a `natural' cooperative game, called bifocal distribution game, to show that both the Nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) and the Shapley value (Shapley (1953a)) agree on recommending the average of the two focal proposals. Furthermore, we analyze the interpretation of the previous result by means of axiomatic arguments. Keywords: Distribution problems, Cooperative games, Axiomatic analysis, Nucleolus, Shapley value. JEL Classi fication Numbers: C71, D63, D71.
33 - Economia
Jocs cooperatius
Economia del benestar
Elecció social
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19 p.
Working Paper
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2013-20

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