Utilizad este identificador para citar o enlazar este documento: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/215036

Employment Protection, International Specialization, and Innovation
Saint-Paul, Gilles
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
We develop a model to analyse the implications of firing costs on incentives for R&D and international specialization. The Key idea is paying the firing cost, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relatively secure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle. Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where, roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country will specialize in 'secondary innovations', that is, improvements in existing goods, while the low firing cost country will more specialize in 'primary innovation', that is, invention of new goods.
10-07-2013
Employment protection, innovation, R&D, international product cycle, labour market flexibility
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