Utilizad este identificador para citar o enlazar este documento: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/214537

Money, Fame and the Allocation of Talent: Brain Drain, the Matthew Effect and the Institution of Science
Menicucci, Domenico; Jeon, Doh-Shin
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in the private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In this paper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role of the institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector and the private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model the institution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). We show that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the science sector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate the brain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through the market might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and thereby worsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetary and non-monetary incentives in science.
10-07-2013
Fame, Science, Brain Drain, Incentives, Asymmetric Information
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