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Título:	A theory of optimal random crackdowns
Autor/a:	Eeckhout, Jan; Persico, Nicola; Todd, Petra
Abstract:	An incentives based theory of policing is developed which can explain the phenomenon of random “crackdowns,” i.e., intermittent periods of high interdiction/surveillance. For a variety of police objective functions, random crackdowns can be part of the optimal monitoring strategy. We demonstrate support for implications of the crackdown theory using traffic data gathered by the Belgian Police Department and use the model to estimate the deterrence effect/nof additional resources spent on speeding interdiction.
Materia(s):	-Prevenció del delicte -Crackdowns
Derechos:	© 2010 American Economic Association. Can be found online at: http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.100.3.1104
Tipo de documento:	Artículo Artículo - Versión publicada
Editor:	American Economic Association
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