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A theory of optimal random crackdowns
Eeckhout, Jan; Persico, Nicola; Todd, Petra
An incentives based theory of policing is developed which can explain the phenomenon of random “crackdowns,” i.e., intermittent periods of high interdiction/surveillance. For a variety of police objective functions, random crackdowns can be part of the optimal monitoring strategy. We demonstrate support for implications of the crackdown theory using traffic data gathered by the Belgian Police Department and use the model to estimate the deterrence effectof additional resources spent on speeding interdiction.
2013-07-02
Prevenció del delicte
Crackdowns
© 2010 American Economic Association. Can be found online at: http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.100.3.1104
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info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
American Economic Association
         

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