dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
dc.contributor.author |
Llerena Garrés, Francesc |
dc.contributor.author |
Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia |
dc.date.accessioned |
2013-06-13T07:52:21Z |
dc.date.available |
2013-06-13T07:52:21Z |
dc.date.created |
2013-05-28 |
dc.date.issued |
2013 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/212194 |
dc.format.extent |
13 p. |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.publisher |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2013-15 |
dc.rights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.source |
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) |
dc.subject.other |
Jocs cooperatius |
dc.title |
The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
33 - Economia |
dc.embargo.terms |
cap |
dc.description.abstract |
In this paper, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten, 1978)
and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations
in the equal division core (Dutta-Ray, 1991). Both results are based on a geometrical
decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons.
Keywords: Cooperative game, equity core, equal division core, Lorenz domination.
JEL classification: C71 |