Utilizad este identificador para citar o enlazar este documento: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/208424

Debt enforcement and relational contracting
Brown, Martin; Serra-García, Marta
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa
We examine how third-party debt enforcement affects the emergence and performance ofrelational contracts in credit markets. We implement an experiment with finitely repeatedcredit relationships in which borrowers can default. In the weak enforcement treatmentdefaulting borrowers can keep their funds invested. In the strong enforcement treatmentdefaulting borrowers have to liquidate their investment. Under weak enforcement fewerrelationships emerge in which loans are extended and repaid. When such relationships doemerge they exhibit a lower credit volume than under strong enforcement. These findingssuggest that relational contracting in credit markets requires a minimum standard of thirdpartydebt enforcement.
02-2012
336 - Finances. Banca. Moneda. Borsa
Deute
Crèdit
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78 p.
Documento de trabajo
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa
Document de treball (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa);12/1
         

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