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Social capital and the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs
Salas Fumás, Vicente; Sánchez Asín, J. Javier
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa
Social capital is viewed either as a proprietary asset that serves private interests, including those of entrepreneurs, or as a collective asset that supports trust-based transactions saving on transaction costs both in markets and within the boundaries of firms, and benefiting society as a whole. This paper explains the relative specialization between entrepreneurs and market-governed exchanges as a result of the interaction between social capital that lowers transaction costs, and the scale economies of ability in managerial jobs (Lucas 1978). The main hypothesis formulated in the paper is that higher social capital will benefit the hierarchy relatively more than the market as a governance mechanism, and therefore in economies with higher social capital, the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs will be lower and their average span of control larger than in economies with lower social capital. The empirical evidence, with data from the Spanish Autonomous Communities, is consistent with this prediction.
65 - Gestió i organització. Administració i direcció d'empreses. Publicitat. Relacions públiques. Mitjans de comunicació de masses
Empreses -- Direcció i administració
Capital social
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43 p.
Working Paper
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa
Document de treball (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa);11/5

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