Title:
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Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games
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Author:
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Calleja, Pere; Rafels, Carles; Tijs, Stef
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Other authors:
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Universitat de Barcelona |
Abstract:
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[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora. |
Abstract:
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[eng] We characterize single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games satisfying core selection and aggregate monotonicity. Fur- thermore, we show that these two properties are compatible with individual rationality, the dummy player property and the symmetry property. We nish characterizing single-valued solutions satisfying these ve properties. |
Subject(s):
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-Economia matemàtica -Teoria de jocs -Simetria (Matemàtica) -Mathematical economics -Game theory -Symmetry (Mathematics) |
Rights:
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cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Calleja Cortés et al., 2010
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ |
Document type:
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Working Paper |
Published by:
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Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
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