To access the full text documents, please follow this link:

Contractual resolutions of financial distress
Gennaioli, Nicola; Rossi, Stefano
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress. Weshow that a debt structure where two distinct debt classes co-exist - one class fully concentrated andwith control rights upon default, the other dispersed and without control rights - removes the controllingcreditor's liquidation bias when investor protection is strong. These results rationalize the use and theperformance of floating charge financing, debt financing where the controlling creditor takes the entirebusiness as collateral, in countries with strong investor protection. Our theory predicts that the efficiency ofcontractual resolutions of financial distress should increase with investor protection.
Macroeconomics and International Economics
financial distress
investor protection
financial contracting
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
Working Paper

Show full item record

Related documents