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Selective hiring and welfare analysis in labor market models
Merkl, Christian; van Rens, Thijs
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
Firms select not only how many, but also which workers to hire. Yet, in standardsearch models of the labor market, all workers have the same probability of being hired.We argue that selective hiring crucially affects welfare analysis. Our model is isomorphicto a search model under random hiring but allows for selective hiring. With selectivehiring, the positive predictions of the model change very little, but the welfare costsof unemployment are much larger because unemployment risk is distributed unequallyacross workers. As a result, optimal unemployment insurance may be higher and welfareis lower if hiring is selective.
26-11-2012
Macroeconomics and International Economics
labor market models
welfare
optimal unemployment insurance
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