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Audit risk and rent extraction: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil
Litschig, Stephan; Zamboni, Yves
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
We report results from a randomized policy experiment designed to test whether increasedaudit risk deters rent extraction in local public procurement and service delivery in Brazil. Ourestimates suggest that temporarily increasing annual audit risk by about 20 percentage pointsreduced the proportion of irregular local procurement processes by about 17 percentage points.This reduction was driven entirely by irregularities involving mismanagement or corruption. Incontrast, we find no evidence that increased audit risk affected the quality of publicly providedpreventive and primary health care services -measured based on user satisfaction surveys- orcompliance with national regulations of the conditional cash transfer program "Bolsa Família".
2012-11-26
Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics
corruption
rents
local governments
law enforcement
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Working Paper
         

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