dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
dc.contributor.author |
Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel |
dc.date.accessioned |
2012-10-29T18:43:59Z |
dc.date.available |
2012-10-29T18:43:59Z |
dc.date.created |
2012-10-03 |
dc.date.issued |
2012 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/203171 |
dc.format.extent |
34 p. |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.publisher |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2012-30 |
dc.rights |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.rights |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
dc.source |
RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) |
dc.subject.other |
Teoria de jocs |
dc.subject.other |
Incertesa -- Models matemàtics |
dc.subject.other |
Contractes -- Aspectes econòmics |
dc.title |
The Limits of Discrete Time Repeated Games:Some Notes and Comments |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
33 - Economia |
dc.embargo.terms |
cap |
dc.description.abstract |
This paper studies the limits of discrete time repeated games with public monitoring. We solve and characterize the Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce
(1991) problem. We found that for the "bad" ("good") news model the
lower (higher) magnitude events suggest cooperation, i.e., zero punishment probability, while the highrt (lower) magnitude events suggest defection, i.e., punishment with probability one. Public correlation is used
to connect these two sets of signals and to make the enforceability to bind.
The dynamic and limit behavior of the punishment probabilities for variations in ... (the discount rate) and ... (the time interval) are characterized,
as well as the limit payo¤s for all these scenarios (We also introduce uncertainty in the time domain). The obtained ... limits are to the best of my
knowledge, new. The obtained ... limits coincide with Fudenberg and
Levine (2007) and Fudenberg and Olszewski (2011), with the exception
that we clearly state the precise informational conditions that cause the
limit to converge from above, to converge from below or to degenerate.
JEL: C73, D82, D86.
KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Pub-
lic Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes. |