Utilizad este identificador para citar o enlazar este documento: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/1980

Selecting negotiation processes with Health Care
Martínez Giralt, Xavier; Barros, Pedro Pita
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We address the question of how a third-party payer (e.g. an insurer) decides what providers to contract with. Three different mechanisms are studied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists in the third-party payer setting up a bargaining procedure with both providers jointly and simultaneously. A second mechanism envisages the outcome of the same simultaneous bargaining but independently with every provider. Finally, the last mechanism is of different nature. It is the so-called "any willing provider" where the third-party payer announces a contract and every provider freely decides to sign it or not. The main finding is that the decision of the third-party payer depends on the surplus to be shared. When it is relatively high the third-party payer prefers the any willing provider system. When, on the contrary, the surplus is relatively low, the third-party payer will select one of the other two systems accor ing to how bargaining power is distributed.
09-05-2006
Planificació sanitària
Economia de la salut
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Working papers; 467.00
         

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