Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/1979

Self-selection consistent functions
Beviá, Carmen; Barberà, Salvador, 1946-
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing envy-free allocation consistent rules, we also explore whether such rules may also respect the Condorcet criterion.
2006-05-09
Decisió, Presa de -- Models matemàtics
Elecció (Psicologia)
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Working Paper
Working papers; 468.00
         

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