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Bribes for faster delivery
Sanyal, Amal
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
The paper models the practice of charging bribes for faster delivery of essential services in third world countries. It then examines the possibility of curbing corruption by supervision, and secondly, by introducing competition among delivery agents. It is argued that a supervisory solution eludes the problem because no hard evidence of the reduction of corruption can be established for this type of offenses. It is also shown that using more than one supplier cannot eliminate the practice, and the bribe paying part of the market attains a determinate proportion as the number of suppliers increases. However the bribe rate and average waiting time come down at a diminishing rate with increase in the number of suppliers, and this property can be used to determine an optimal number of suppliers.
Frau -- Països en vies de desenvolupament
Corrupció administrativa -- Països en vies de desenvolupament
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Working Paper
Working papers; 474.00

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