Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/1942

Preventive health care and payment systems to providers
Barros, Pedro Pita; Martínez Giralt, Xavier
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
Prevention has been a main issue of recent policy orientations in health care. This renews the interest on how different organizational designs and the definition of payment schemes to providers may affect the incentives to provide preventive health care. We present, both the normative and the positive analyses of the change from independent providers to integrated services. We show the evaluation of that change to depend on the particular way payment to providers is done. We focus on the externality resulting from referral decisions from primary to acute care providers. This makes our analysis complementary to most works in the literature allowing to address in a more direct way the issue of preventive health care.
2006-05-09
Medicina preventiva -- Aspectes econòmics
Política sanitària -- Aspectes econòmics
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Working Paper
Working papers; 507.02
         

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