Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/1938

Voting by committees with exit
Berga, Dolors; Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying voters' sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.
2006-05-09
Elecció social -- Models matemàtics
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat, la unitat i l’institut i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/)
Working Paper
Working papers; 511.02
         

Full text files in this document

Files Size Format
51102.pdf 251.2 KB PDF

Show full item record

Related documents

Other documents of the same author

Berga, Dolors; Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
 

Coordination

 

Supporters