Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/1901

On bilateral agreements: just a matter of matching
Martínez Giralt, Xavier; Nicolini, Rosella
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technological endowments when firms decide to establish a technological agreement. We propose a Bertrand duopoly model where firms evaluate the advantages they can get from the agreement according to its length. Allowing them to exploit a learning process, we depict a strict connection between the starting point and the final result. Moreover, as far as learning is evaluated as an iterative process, the set of initial conditions that lead to successful ventures switches from a continuum of values to a Cantor set.
2006-05-09
Duopolis
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Working Paper
Working papers; 548.02
         

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