Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/1879

Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring
Socorro Quevedo, María del Pilar
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of a RJV. We assume that when intervening the Government suffers an additional adverse selection problem because it is not able to distinguish the value of the potential innovation. Although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms' free-riding problem, they imply different social losses if the Government is not able to perfectly distinguish the value of the potential innovation. The supremacy of monitoring tools over subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the Government is able to obtain about firms' R&D performance.
2006-05-09
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Working Paper
Working papers; 570.03
         

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