dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor.author |
Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat |
dc.date.accessioned |
2006-04-27T14:45:54Z |
dc.date.available |
2006-04-27T14:45:54Z |
dc.date.issued |
2003 |
dc.identifier.issn |
1576 - 3382 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/1774 |
dc.format.extent |
112762 bytes |
dc.format.mimetype |
application/pdf |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2003-4 |
dc.rights |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
dc.subject |
Integració monetària |
dc.subject |
Política fiscal |
dc.title |
Should fiscal authorities cooperate in a monetary union with public deficit targets? |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.description.abstract |
In this paper we analyse the setting of optimal policies in a monetary union with one monetary authority and various fiscal authorities that have a public deficit target. We will show that fiscal cooperation among the fiscal authorities, in the presence of positive supply shocks, ends up producing higher public deficits than in a non-cooperative regime. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0. Keywords: monetary union, fiscal policy coordination. |