Should fiscal authorities cooperate in a monetary union with public deficit targets?

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dc.contributor	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
dc.contributor.author	Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat
dc.date.accessioned	2006-04-27T14:45:54Z
dc.date.available	2006-04-27T14:45:54Z
dc.date.issued	2003
dc.identifier.issn	1576 - 3382
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2072/1774
dc.format.extent	112762 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2003-4
dc.rights	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/)
dc.subject	Integració monetària
dc.subject	Política fiscal
dc.title	Should fiscal authorities cooperate in a monetary union with public deficit targets?
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we analyse the setting of optimal policies in a monetary union with one monetary authority and various fiscal authorities that have a public deficit target. We will show that fiscal cooperation among the fiscal authorities, in the presence of positive supply shocks, ends up producing higher public deficits than in a non-cooperative regime. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0. Keywords: monetary union, fiscal policy coordination.

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