dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
dc.contributor.author |
Theilen, Bernd, 1965- |
dc.date.accessioned |
2011-09-19T15:28:56Z |
dc.date.available |
2011-09-19T15:28:56Z |
dc.date.created |
2011 |
dc.date.issued |
2011 |
dc.identifier.issn |
1988 - 0812 |
dc.identifier.other |
T - 1323 - 2011 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/169684 |
dc.format.extent |
25 |
dc.format.extent |
345599 bytes |
dc.format.mimetype |
application/pdf |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2011-15 |
dc.rights |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
dc.subject.other |
Subcontractació |
dc.title |
Decentralization of contracts with interim sidecontracting |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
33 - Economia |
dc.description.abstract |
This paper gives a new explanation for the phenomena of subcontracting. A model
in which a principal contracts two agents who work in a sequence on a project, have soft
information and can collude is considered. Side-contracts between agents can be signed
at any stage of the game. Due to limited liability and moral hazard agents obtain a rent.
The principal’s problem is to find the preferable contracting structure. It is shown that in
this setting a decentralized contracting structure can be superior to a centralized structure
for the principal. The paper derives the conditions under which this holds.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22.
Keywords: Contract delegation, Collusion, Interim side-contracting, Moral hazard. |