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Free Mobility and Taste-Homogeneity of Jurisdiction Structures
Dahm, Matthias
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
We consider a population of agents distributed on the unit interval. Agents form jurisdictions in order to provide a public facility and share its costs equally. This creates an incentive to form large entities. Individuals also incur a transportation cost depending on their location and that of the facility which makes small jurisdictions advantageous. We consider a fairly general class of distributions of agents and generalize previous versions of this model by allowing for non-linear transportation costs. We show that, in general, jurisdictions are not necessarily homogeneous. However, they are if facilities are always intraterritory and transportation costs are superadditive. Superadditivity can be weakened to strictly increasing and strictly concave when agents are uniformly distributed. Keywords: Consecutiveness, stratification, local public goods, coalition formation, country formation. JEL Classification: C71 (Cooperative Games), D71 (Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations), H73 (Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects).
332 - Economia regional i territorial. Economia del sòl i de la vivenda
Jocs cooperatius
Elecció social
Béns públics
Coalició (Ciències socials)
Desigualtats regionals
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Working Paper
1988 - 0812
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2009-01

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