Resum:
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We consider a population of agents distributed on the unit interval. Agents form jurisdictions
in order to provide a public facility and share its costs equally. This creates an incentive
to form large entities. Individuals also incur a transportation cost depending on their location
and that of the facility which makes small jurisdictions advantageous. We consider a
fairly general class of distributions of agents and generalize previous versions of this model by
allowing for non-linear transportation costs. We show that, in general, jurisdictions are not
necessarily homogeneous. However, they are if facilities are always intraterritory and transportation
costs are superadditive. Superadditivity can be weakened to strictly increasing
and strictly concave when agents are uniformly distributed.
Keywords: Consecutiveness, stratification, local public goods, coalition formation, country
formation.
JEL Classification: C71 (Cooperative Games), D71 (Social Choice; Clubs; Committees;
Associations), H73 (Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects). |