Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/158

Governance mechanisms in Spanish financial intermediaries
Crespí i Cladera, Rafael; García-Cestona, Miguel A.; Salas Fumás, Vicente
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa
This paper examines the governance of Spanish Banks around two main issues. First, does a poor economic performance activate those governance interventions that favor the removal of executive directors and the merger of non-performing banks? And second, does the relationship between governance intervention and economic performance vary with the ownership form of the bank? Our results show that a bad performance does activate governance mechanisms in banks, although for the case of Savings Banks intervention is confined to a merger or acquisition. Nevertheless, the distinct ownership structure of Savings Banks does not fully protect non-performing banks from disappearing. Product-market competition compensates for those weak internal governance mechanisms that result from an ownership form which gives voice to several stakeholder groups.
2002-09
Institucions financeres -- Espanya
Bancs -- Direcció i administració -- Espanya
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Working Paper
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa
Document de treball (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa);02/9
         

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