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What do outside experts bring to a committee? Evidence from the Bank of England
Hansen, Stephen Eliot; McMahon, Michael
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
We test whether outside experts have information not available to insiders by usingthe voting record of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee. Memberswith more private information should vote more often against conventional wisdom,which we measure as the average belief of market economists about future interest rates. We find evidence that external members indeed have information notavailable to internals, but also use a quasi-natural experiment to show they mayexaggerate their expertise to obtain reappointment. This implies that an optimalcommittee, even outside monetary policy, should potentially include outsiders, butneeds to manage career concerns.
09-06-2011
Business Economics and Industrial Organization
expert behavior
committees
monetary policy.
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