Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/152034

Candidate quality in a Downsian Model with a continuous policy space
Aragonès, Enriqueta; Xefteris, Dimitrios
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
This paper characterizes a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections with a continuous policy space, where candidates are office motivated and one candidate enjoys a non-policy advantage over the other candidate. We assume that voters have quadratic preferences over policies and that their ideal points are drawn from a uniform distribution over the unit interval. In our equilibrium the advantaged candidate chooses the expected median voter with probability one and the disadvantaged candidate uses a mixed strategy that is symmetric around it. We show that this equilibrium exists if the number of voters is large enough relative to the size of the advantage.
2011-06-09
Nash, Varietats de
Eleccions -- Models matemàtics
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Working Paper
Working papers; 859.11
         

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