dc.contributor |
Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
dc.contributor.author |
Zudenkova, Galina |
dc.date.accessioned |
2011-05-11T14:01:56Z |
dc.date.available |
2011-05-11T14:01:56Z |
dc.date.created |
2010 |
dc.date.issued |
2010 |
dc.identifier.issn |
ISSN 1988 - 0812 |
dc.identifier.other |
T – 2017 - 2010 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/151618 |
dc.format.extent |
28 |
dc.format.extent |
422579 bytes |
dc.format.mimetype |
application/pdf |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2010-21 |
dc.rights |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat i el departament i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
dc.subject.other |
Eleccions |
dc.title |
A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
32 - Política |
dc.description.abstract |
In this paper, I provide a formal justi cation for a well-established coattail effect,
when a popular candidate at one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from
the same political party for other branches of government. A political agency frame-
work with moral hazard is applied to analyze coattails in simultaneous presidential and
congressional elections. I show that coattail voting is a natural outcome of the optimal
reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians' efforts in a
retrospective voting environment. I assume that an office-motivated politician (executive
or congressman) prefers her counterpart to be affiliated with the same political party.
This correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation
rule, which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or different
parties. The two-sided coattail effects then arise. On the one hand, the executive's suc-
cess/failure props up/drags down her partisan ally in congressional election, which implies
presidential coattails. On the other hand, the executive's reelection itself is affected by
the congressman's performance, which results in reverse coattails.
JEL classi fication: D72, D86.
Keywords: Coattail voting; Presidential coattails; Reverse coattails; Simultaneous
elections; Political Agency; Retrospective voting. |