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The Cost of ownership in the governance of interfirm collaborations
Rialp Criado, Josep; Salas Fumás, Vicente
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa
This paper investigates the selection of governance forms in interfirm collaborations taking into account the predictions from transaction costs and property rights theories. Transaction costs arguments are often used to justify the introduction of hierarchical controls in collaborations, but the ownership dimension of going from “contracts” to “hierarchies” has been ignored in the past and with it the so called “costs of ownership”. The theoretical results, tested with a sample of collaborations in which participate Spanish firms, indicate that the cost of ownership may offset the benefits of hierarchical controls and therefore limit their diffusion. Evidence is also reported of possible complementarities between reputation effects and forms of ownership that go together with hierarchical controls (i.e. joint ventures), in contrast with the generally assumed substitutability between the two.
Empreses -- Direcció i administració -- Models matemàtics
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Working Paper
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa
Document de treball (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia de l'Empresa);00/1

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