Title:
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Vote validatability in Mix-Net-based eVoting
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Author:
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Bibiloni, Pedro; Escala Ribas, Alex; Morillo Bosch, M. Paz
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Other authors:
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Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. Departament de Matemàtiques; Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya. MAK - Matemàtica Aplicada a la Criptografia |
Abstract:
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One way to build secure electronic voting systems is to use Mix-Nets, which break any correlation between voters and their votes. One of the characteristics of Mix-Net-based eVoting is that ballots are usually decrypted individually and, as a consequence, invalid votes can be detected during the tallying of the election. In particular, this means that the ballot does not need to contain a proof of the vote being valid. However, allowing for invalid votes to be detected only during the tally- ing of the election can have bad consequences on the reputation of the election. First, casting a ballot for an invalid vote might be considered as an attack against the eVoting system by non-technical people, who might expect that the system does not accept such ballots. Besides, it would be impossible to track the attacker due to the anonymity provided by the Mix-Net. Second, if a ballot for an invalid vote is produced by a software bug, it might be only detected after the election period has nished. In particular, voters would not be able to cast a valid vote again. In this work we formalize the concept of having a system that detects invalid votes during the election period. In addition, we give a general construction of an eVoting system satisfying such property and an e - cient concrete instantiation based on well-studied assumptions |
Abstract:
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One way to build secure electronic voting systems is to use Mix-Nets, which break any correlation between voters and their votes. One of the characteristics of Mix-Net-based eVoting is that ballots are usually decrypted individually and, as a consequence, invalid votes can be detected during the tallying of the election. In particular, this means that the ballot does not need to contain a proof of the vote being valid. However, allowing for invalid votes to be detected only during the tally- ing of the election can have bad consequences on the reputation of the election. First, casting a ballot for an invalid vote might be considered as an attack against the eVoting system by non-technical people, who might expect that the system does not accept such ballots. Besides, it would be impossible to track the attacker due to the anonymity provided by the Mix-Net. Second, if a ballot for an invalid vote is produced by a software bug, it might be only detected after the election period has nished. In particular, voters would not be able to cast a valid vote again. In this work we formalize the concept of having a system that detects invalid votes during the election period. In addition, we give a general construction of an eVoting system satisfying such property and an e - cient concrete instantiation based on well-studied assumptions |
Abstract:
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Peer Reviewed |
Subject(s):
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-Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Matemàtiques i estadística::Investigació operativa::Programació matemàtica -Programming (Mathematics) -Electronic Voting Systems -Mix-Nets -Formal Definitions -Programació (Matemàtica) -Classificació AMS::65 Numerical analysis::65K Mathematical programming, optimization and variational techniques |
Rights:
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
Document type:
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Article - Submitted version Article |
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