An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets

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Title:	An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
Author:	Llerena Garrés, Francesc; Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva); Rafels, Carles
Other authors:	Universitat de Barcelona
Abstract:	On the domain of two-sided assignment markets with agents' reservation values, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies consistency with respect to Owen's reduced game and symmetry of maximum complaints of the two sides. As an adjunt, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of the bisection property that characterizes the intersection between the core and the kernel of a coalitional game in Maschler et al. (1979)
Subject(s):	-Teoria de jocs -Teoria de conjunts -Lògica matemàtica -Presa de decisions -Game theory -Set theory -Mathematical logic -Decision making
Rights:	(c) Springer Verlag, 2015
Document type:	Article Article - Accepted version
Published by:	Springer Verlag
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