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Title:
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The number of parties and decision making in legislatures
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Author:
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Bannikova, Marina; Jelnov, Artyom
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Other authors:
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Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia; Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública |
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Abstract:
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This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which
have to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist who is interested
in a certain outcome of the vote. We show that the ease of manipulating a legislature
decision by the lobbyist is increasing with the number of parties. A high threshold
leads to fewer parties represented, and consequently, decreases the ease of changing
a legislature decision by the lobbyist. On the other hand, a high threshold may
cause a misrepresentation of voters. We show that if the threshold is higher that
6%, the impact of the misrepresentation effect becomes significant. |
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Publication date:
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2016 |
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Subject (UDC):
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32 - Política |
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Subject(s):
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Ciències polítiques -- Presa de decisions
Partits polítics
Grups de pressió |
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Rights:
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L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ |
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Pages:
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8 p. |
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Document type:
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Working Paper |
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Published by:
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Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
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Collection:
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Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2016-13
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